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RACE, FACE, AND RAWLS
Anita L. Allen*
INTRODUCTION

It was just shy of one hundred years ago that a state supreme court
explicitly recognized the right of privacy for the very first time.1 Social
contract theory played an interesting role in the Georgia Supreme
Court's historic natural law argument in favor of the new right.
Privacy, the court suggested, is one of the things individuals in a "state
of nature" would expect a government they willingly embraced to
protect;2 for who would give up natural freedom to live under a
sovereign that failed to safeguard interests so vital as the interest in
privacy?
Perhaps social contract theory can once again play a rhetorical role
in illuminating the case for the legal protection of privacy. In the last
century, the Georgia high court adduced contractarian philosophy to
help make a case for the privacy of a person's face. In this Essay, I
propose to ask, with the contractarian philosopher John Rawls in
mind, whether it is time to recognize the privacy of a person's race.
Race was a major theme in the public policy of the United States
during John Rawls's adult life. Moreover, privacy emerged as a major
theme during his period of greatest fame.3 Rawls chose to make
extensive studies of neither race nor privacy. That Rawls had so little
to say about race law, policy, and values is especially remarkable given
the overall preoccupation of his work with equal opportunity, the least
advantaged members of society, and political conceptions of just
institutions and practices.
It is not the late John Rawls, but David A.J. Richards who has
made the most extensive, philosophically informed study of the
implications of social contractarianism for some aspect of privacy law.4
Richards has deeply engaged the social contract tradition to make an
* Anita L. Allen is Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of
Pennsylvania. She received her J.D. from Harvard University, and her Ph.D. in
Philosophy from the University of Michigan.
1. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
2. Id. at 69.
3. Cf Anita L. Allen, Privacy, in Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Hugh
LaFollette ed., 2003) (describing the emergence of privacy as a theme within
academic philosophy in response to developments in society).
4. See David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (1986).
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historical and normative case for expanding constitutional protection
of decisional privacy, arguing for laws tolerating abortion as well as
sexual autonomy for gays and lesbians.5
Tolerance, Richards
persuasively claims, is a core contractarian ideal and an original
constitutional principle.6

Toleration may indeed be an important principle implicit in the
contractarian intellectual traditions that influenced the American
Constitution. However, the contractarian intellectual tradition is not
inherently liberal.

As an historical matter, famous social contract

theorists have not had a lot to say about race or the betterment of
disadvantaged racial minorities, and what they have had to say has
often been disheartening. 7

Pragmatic uses of contract theory by American courts have often
been disheartening as well. Most notably, contractarian arguments
were employed by the antebellum courts to justify slavery and
political exclusion. Social contract rationalizations "validated" slavery
by characterizing blacks as outside of the American social contract or
as parties to a social contract under which they consented to bondage
in exchange for protection.8 These uses of the social contract
metaphor are objectionable because of what they hide and repress. It
was plain wrong to resign people to human slavery through selfserving contractarian ideals of consent and self-interest.9
5. Id. at 261-80.
6. Id. at 252-53.
7. See generally Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law,
51 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Anita L. Allen & Thaddeus Pope, Social Contract Theory,
Slavery, and the Antebellum Courts, in A Companion to African-American
Philosophy 125 (Tommy L. Lott & John P. Pittman eds., 2003) (studying the role of
social contract theory in American case law and legal thought).
8. See Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509 (1846); Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38
(1837). Cf Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445, 459 (1848); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235,
250 (1859); Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856). See generally The
Constitution: A Pro-Slavery Compact (Wendell Phillips ed., 1856).
The Supreme Court applied social contract thinking to the question of black
citizenship in the infamous case of Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), in
which Justice Taney argued that slaveholding states would not have agreed to the
Constitution if they had thought the word "citizens" included free blacks.
9. See State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845); cf. Jonas Bernstein, New Study Sweeps
Arab Slaving out from Under the Carpet,Wash. Times, July 3, 1989, at D7 (finding a
paternalistic contractarian justification for slavery in Arab culture). Some courts
argued that slaves were actually benefited by their "consent" to bondage. See Hervy
v. Armstrong, 15 Ark. 162, 168 (1854) ("The elevation of the white race, and the
happiness of the slave, vitally depend upon maintaining the ascendancy of one and
the submission of the other."); Pendleton, 6 Ark. at 512 ("The two races differing as
they do in complexion, habits, conformation and intellectual endowments, could not
nor ever will live together upon terms of social or political equality."); Collins v.
Hutchins, 21 Ga. 270, 274 (1857) ("A negro... [has] the power of thought and
volition.., but does not generally have judgment to direct him in what is proper for
him, or prudence and self-denial to restrain him from the use of what is injurious.");
Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 205-06 (1853) ("[Tlhe slave who receives the care and
protection of a tolerable master, is superior in comfort to the free negro."); Gorman
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John Rawls's magnificent theory of justice as fairness is importantly
egalitarian and mindful of the requirements of liberty in the political
realm. Still, progressive lawyers and philosophers interested in racial
justice have not often engaged Rawls, whether to embrace or to reject
his project. Rawls self-consciously subordinated racial justice to
economic justice, and there is no bounty of specific race perspectives
in the Rawls corpus for anyone to engage. Racial justice as such was
not one of the urgent priorities of Rawls's abstract, idealistic, and
modernist philosophy. There is little point to turning to Rawls for
insights about the meaning and nature of race, the significance of
racial identity, or optimal race-related law and public policies. Other
contemporary philosophers-Kwame Anthony Appiah,' ° Lucius
Outlaw,"1 Naomi Zack, 2 Adrian Piper,13 and Bernard Boxill 4-have
contributed important insights about race.
Rawls's brilliant and subtle prescriptions offer no distinct
progressive or conservative resolution to the concrete legal and policy
race problems of our times. Among undergraduate philosophy
teachers in the 1970s and 1980s, a favorite exercise was to ask students
whether affirmative action would pass muster with Rawls's theory of
justice. Perhaps the relevant test of the practical value of an abstract,
general theory of justice is whether it provides a conceptual and
normative framework for illuminating worldly debates about the
requirements of justice, debates it may not expressly address. In a
very, very general way Rawls can help clarify what is at stake in the
affirmative action debates; his work is similarly-but no morehelpful to the related emerging racial privacy debates.
I. FACIAL PRIVACY

An artist named Paolo Pavesich awoke one day in 1904 to discover
that a photograph of him taken by a professional photographer named
J.Q. Adams was included in an advertisement for insurance. 5 The
advertisement appeared in Atlanta's main newspaper, the Atlanta
v. Campbell, 14 Ga. 137, 143 (1853) ("We must... [make] it the interest of all who
employ slaves, to watch over their lives and safety. Their improvidence demands it.
They are incapable of self-preservation, either in danger or in disease."); Neal v.
Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 582 (1851); Vance, 4 Ga. at 459 ("[W]e concede that the condition
of our slaves is humble, still it is infinitely better than it would have been, but for this
very system of bondage, better than the lower orders in Europe, and better far than it
would be, if they were emancipated here .... "); Peter v. Hargrave, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.)
12, 19 (1848); Spencer v. Pilcher, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 565, 584 (1837).
10. See, e.g., K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Guttman, Color Conscious: The
Political Morality of Race (1996).
11. See, e.g., Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy (1996).
12. See, e.g., Naomi Zack, Philosophy of Science and Race (2002).
13. See, e.g., Adrian Piper, Passingfor White, Passingfor Black, in Passing and the
Fictions of Identity (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996).
14. See, e.g., Bernard R. Boxill, Blacks and Social Justice (1984).
15. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905).
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Constitution.16 Accompanying the photograph was the following
statement, supposedly a quote from Pavesich: "In my healthy and
productive period of life I bought insurance in the New England
Mutual Life Insurance Co., of Boston, Mass., and to-day my family is
protected and I am drawing an annual dividend on my paid-up
policies."17 In reality, Pavesich had never purchased insurance from
New England Mutual Life, nor had he given Adams or the insurance
company permission to use his photograph. 8
Pavesich sued the photographer, the general agent of the insurance
company, whose name appeared in the ad, and the insurance
company, seeking $25,000 in damages. 9 Pavesich alleged "a trespass
upon [his] right of privacy," as well as "breach of confidence and
trust. '2' The trial court had thrown out the claims but on appeal to
the Georgia Supreme Court, Pavesich won a reversal.
That Pavesich prevailed was remarkable. Just a few years earlier,
the New York Court of Appeals had refused to recognize a right to
privacy claimed by a woman whose photograph was used without her
consent on packaging for flour.22 The New York court declared in
good positivistic fashion that "[tihere is no precedent for such an
action to be found in the decisions of this court. 'z3 A dissenting judge
was prepared to recognize a right to privacy, since "new conditions
affecting the relations of persons demand the broader extension of
those legal principles
which underlie the immunity of one's person
24
from attack.,
Unrestrained by positivism, the Georgia high court bravely
announced that a right to privacy protecting the human face must be
recognized as a matter of fair inference from common law principles. 5
Moreover, the right to privacy has roots in natural instincts, the court
argued. 6 A person's face is a private matter, and an aspect of liberty.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
23. Id. at 443.
24. Id. at 450.
25. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69-70.
While neither Sir William Blackstone nor any of the other writers on the
principles of the common law have referred in terms to the right of privacy,
the illustrations given by them as to what would be a violation of the
absolute rights of individuals are not to be taken as exhaustive, but the
language should be allowed to include any instance of a violation of such
rights which is clearly within the true meaning and intent of the words used
to declare the principle.
Id. at 70.
26. In the court's words:
The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is
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A photographic representation of a person's face circulated to the
general public without consent violates the person's general liberty to
choose the manner in which he or she lives:
One may desire to live a life of seclusion; another may desire to live
a life of publicity; still another may wish to live a life of privacy as to
certain matters, and of publicity as to others. One may wish to live a
life of toil where his work is of a nature that keeps him constantly
before the public gaze, while another may wish to live a life of
research and contemplation, only moving before the public at such
times and under such circumstances as may be necessary to his
actual existence. Each is entitled to a liberty of choice as to his
manner of life, and neither an individual nor
27 the public has a right to
arbitrarily take away from him his liberty.
Who would voluntarily surrender the natural liberty of the state of
nature-liberty to choose between seclusion and publicity-to a
sovereign who was not bound to protect him? No rational man would
do so, the court reasoned in classic contractarian fashion. 2 Neither a
photograph nor "the body of a person can... be put on exhibition at
any time or at any place without his consent. '29 For "[t]he right of one
to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all proper places,
and in a proper manner is embraced within the right of personal
liberty," and "[t]he right to withdraw from the public gaze at such
times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not

recognized intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be called to
establish its existence. Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition
recognizes at once that as to each individual member of society there are
matters private, and there are matters public so far as the individual is
concerned. Each individual as instinctively resents any encroachment by the
public upon his rights which are of a private nature as he does the
withdrawal of those of his rights which are of a public nature. A right of
privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law.
Id. at 69-70.

27. Id. at 70. Of course, in Georgia at the time, the typical African-American
would have had little choice but to toil in view of others, as menial laborers, servants
and caretakers.
28. Id. at 69.
The individual surrenders to society many rights and privileges which he
would be free to exercise in a state of nature, in exchange for the benefits
which he receives as a member of society. But he is not presumed to
surrender all those rights, and the public has no more right, without his
consent, to invade the domain of those rights which it is necessarily to be
presumed he has reserved than he has to violate the valid regulations of the
organized government under which he lives.
Id.
29. Cf Manola v. Stevens & Meyers (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890) (unpublished opinion)
(enjoining employer's display of photograph of stage dancer taken without her
consent), cited in Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193,195 n.7 (1890).
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demanded by any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of
personal liberty."3
The Pavesich decision essentially created the right to privacy tort.
Born as a right to be free from unwanted commercial use of one's
face, within just a few decades the right broadened into a cluster of
rights which most states recognize-to be free from: (1) appropriation
of name, likeness or identity, (2) intrusion upon seclusion, (3)
publicity placing one in a false light, and (4) unwanted publication of
private facts.31 Tort law includes protection for privacy, and so, too,
does statutory and constitutional law. State and federal constitutional
provisions protect a number of decisional, informational and physical
privacy interests. An expanding number of state and federal statutes
protect interests in informational privacy. Federal statutes create
privacy protections for health data,3 2 financial data,33 school records,34
video rental records, 35 and electronic communications. 36 A New York
statute extends privacy protection to a person's name and likeness.3 7
Although contemporary American tort law recognizes a right to
control commercial uses of a person's face, there are limits placed on
the right. News media may profit handsomely from photographic
images taken without the subject's consent where the subject is caught
up in a news story. 38 Because news publications enjoy a constitutional
and common law privilege, a person caught up willy nilly in a news
event may find her photo in the newspaper and have no valid legal
claim against anyone. The level of her outrage, embarrassment or
humiliation is irrelevant.
30. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70.
All will admit that the individual who desires to live a life of seclusion can
not be compelled, against his consent, to exhibit his person in any public
place, unless such exhibition is demanded by the law of the land. He may be
required to come from his place of seclusion to perform public duties-to
serve as a juror and to testify as a witness, and the like; but when the public
duty is once performed, if he exercises his liberty to go again into seclusion,
no one can deny him the right. One who desires to live a life of partial
seclusion has a right to choose the times, places, and manner in which and at
which he will submit himself to the public gaze.
Id.
31. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960); see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652B-652E.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2000).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2900).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g-1232h (2000).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
36. Id. § 2701.
37. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney 1992).
38. See, e.g., Weil v. Johnson, N.Y. Slip. Op. 50513(U), 2002 WL 31972157, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2002) (explaining why reporting on newsworthy events does
not violate New York's privacy statute). See generally Anita L. Allen, Why Journalists
Can't ProtectPrivacy, in Journalism and the Debate Over Privacy 69 (Craig L. LaMay
ed., 2003) (describing financial and other pressures that lead news media to intrude
into personal lives).
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While there are legal limits on nonconsensual publication of our
photographs, no legal right bars others from gazing at our faces in
public places. Law enforcement authorities used FaceFinder "facial
recognition technology" to scan the crowd at the Tampa football
stadium that hosted Superbowl XXXV.39 By comparing the faces in
the crowd to a data bank of the faces of individuals being sought in
connection with crimes, authorities identified nineteen known
criminals.4" Some people cried foul, but one can just as easily view as
fair that people who attend televised public events with tens of
thousands of others should have no expectation of privacy in their
faces."a Yet the use of technology like FaceFinder rewrites the rules
of social exchange, adding to the costs and risks of appearing in
public. People would opt for radically different modes of life if they
believed government and commercial concerns routinely used facial
recognition technology to identify individuals in crowds and thereby
monitor their comings and goings. Widespread use of facial
recognition technologies and ordinary video surveillance cameras
evoke an Orwellian/Minority Report nightmare of over-monitored
existence that can make us feel less free.

II.

RACIAL PRIVACY

Richard M. Daley was a candidate for mayor of Chicago. 2 He was
also the State's Attorney for Illinois.43 Media giant CBS wanted to
investigate candidate Daley's record on minority employment and
decided to look into how many of his assistant State's Attorneys had
been members of racial minority groups." CBS therefore filed a
request under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act to obtain the
data. 5 Like the federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),46 the

39. See Kathleen Carroll, FindingA Criminal in a Crowd of Faces, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 2001, at C2; cf. Adrea Uhde & Sharon Turco, Ballpark Kiss Was Parolee's
Goodbye, Cincinnati Enq., May 30, 2003, at D2 (discussing arrest of an individual for
outstanding parole violations when a "Kiss Cam" surveillance device identified him in
the stands of a baseball game).
40. See Carroll, supra note 39.
41. See id.
42. See CBS, Inc., v. Partee, 556 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. 1990); see also City Mayors:
Richard M. Daley Mayor of Chicago (chronicling Daley's political career), at
http://www.citymayors.com/usa/chicago.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
43. See CBS, 556 N.E.2d at 648.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 649.
In January 1989 the plaintiff requested the following information from the
State's Attorney: (1) the names of all assistant State's Attorneys; (2) the
race of each assistant State's Attorney; (3) the names of the "First Chair"
assistant State's Attorneys; (4) the names of the assistant State's Attorneys
in supervisory positions to be identified by title and department; and (5) the
most recent salaries of each assistant State's Attorney and the dates of hire.
The defendant gave the plaintiff the names, titles, most recent salaries and
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Illinois counterpart seeks to make the machinations of government
transparent and hold officials accountable through granting the public
access to government records.47 Also like its federal counterpart, the
Illinois statute does not permit the government responding to a FOIA
request to disclose personal information about individuals, such as
medical and employment information.48
The government possessed the race data CBS requested; the data
had been collected and compiled for purposes of federal EEOC
compliance. 49
However, the government refused to give CBS
precisely what it wanted, which was a list of the names of individual
assistant State's Attorneys, each identified by his or her race."° The
government was willing only to provide CBS with what it gave the
EEOC-the aggregate number of minorities in each of five federally
specified categories: white, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and
Native American." Asserting a right to independently verify statistics
reported to the EEOC, CBS sued in Cook County Circuit Court for
an injunction mandating disclosure of the names and races of
individuals.5 2 The court dismissed the suit and CBS appealed.53 An
Illinois appeals court held that the lower court had not abused its
discretion in finding that the Illinois FOIA exempts from disclosure
personnel information that is private, including information about a
person's race. 4
The state appeals court relied heavily on a U.S. Supreme Court
the dates of hire of all assistant State's Attorneys but refused to identify any
assistant State's Attorneys by race.
Id.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
47. See CBS, 556 N.E.2d at 650.
48. See id. According to the court:
This case hinges on the interpretation of section 7 of the FOIA, which
provides, in part, as follows:
The following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:
(b) Information which, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless such disclosure is
consented to in writing by the individual subjects of such information.
The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public
employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal
privacy. Information exempted under this subsection (b) shall include
but is not limited to:
(ii) personnel files and personal information maintained with respect to
employees, appointees or elected officials of any public body or
applicants for such positions ....
Id. (internal citations omitted).
49. See id. at 651.
50. Id. at 649.
51. See id. at 651.
52. Id. at 650.
53. Id. at 649-50.
54. Id. at 656.
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case, United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, in which the Supreme Court denied a media
plaintiff's FOIA request seeking from the Justice Department copies
of its "rap sheets" on four members of the Medico crime family." All
the information contained in the Medico criminal histories was a
matter of public record, a rap sheet being little more than a
compilation of arrests, charges, convictions, and incarcerations, plus
the date of birth and physical characteristics of the record subject.56
The secreting of government rap sheets potentially furthered effective
criminal investigations, but in the Reporters Committee case the
government emphasized that concealment protected the record
subjects' interest in "practical obscurity."57
The Court appears to have had something like this in mind. When
publicly available information about a person is aggregated and the
aggregation publicized, that person's life becomes, as a practical
matter, less private. New attention is paid the person. Certain forms
of repackaging and republication of publicly available information are
offensive to privacy,58 even though the individual facts revealed are a
matter of public record. Extending the reasoning of Reporters
Committee to the facts at hand in CBS, the Illinois court concluded
that even if the fact of a person's race is a matter of public observation
or record, it would not follow that a government record documenting
his or her race should be revealed to the public through the media.59
For that would call attention to individuals' races and diminish their
privacy; the government's publication of racial data would have
implications for the level of privacy those people enjoy. Government
should not act so as to call attention to facts on record about a person
that will result in the person's being an object of perhaps unwanted,
perhaps negative scrutiny.

55. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
56. Id. at 752.
57. Id. at 762. "[T]he fact that '[information] is not wholly "private" does not
mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the
information."' Id. at 770 (citations omitted).
58. See CBS, 556 N.E.2d at 652.
This is especially true in the setting in which this case arose. The then
State's Attorney, Richard M. Daley, was a candidate for mayor of Chicago,
and the question of the racial composition of his office became a political
issue. It is not unreasonable to assume that many assistant State's Attorneys
did not want their names and races to be drawn publicly into a political
dispute. Again judging from the EEOC Compliance Manual, experience has
shown that some persons do not want to disclose their race, even to the
interviewer.
Id.
59. Id. at 653.

1686

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

III. GOVERNMENT MANDATED RACIAL PRIVACY: A GOOD IDEA?
Is their race something about which people are sometimes sensitive,
much as they are often sensitive about their criminal histories and
employment, medical or financial information? There are people who
go to !>ngths to conceal their race and ancestry;6' however, Americans
do not generally consider race a private matter. No federal statute has
been enacted to extend privacy protection to race information.
Disclosing another's race is not grounds for civil liability, criminal
punishment or constitutional objection in the United States. In some
social settings, bringing up race can be impolite and impolitic. But
where there is no suspicion of bias, Americans freely disclose and
discuss information about one another's race and ethnicity all the
time.
Under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, neither state nor federal
government , 6 1
larger
employers, 6
nor
places
of
public
6
3
accommodations are permitted to discriminate on the basis of race.
Schools receiving public funding are not permitted to discriminate. 64
However, collecting and revealing information about race is not
regarded by law as per se racial discrimination. Indeed, governmental
entities freely collect racial, ethnic and national origin data about
individuals and use the data that they collect for a variety of public
purposes.6 5
Race is widely considered sensitive, but it is not widely considered
private. Should it be? Ought a society with a medical privacy statute,
a financial privacy statute, an electronic information privacy statute, a
video rental privacy statute, and an educational record privacy statute
also move to enact racial privacy laws? There has been no great
clamoring for laws protecting racial privacy in the United States,
although the debates over the justice of color-conscious public
policies, such as affirmative action and minority set-asides, have been
heated and long-standing.
California affirmative action foe Ward Connerly spear-headed an
unsuccessful effort to enact a "racial privacy" law in California.66 In
60. See generally Brooke Kroeger, Passing: When People Can't Be Who They
Are (2003).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (2000).
62. Id. § 2000e-2.
63. Id. § 2000a.
64. Id. § 2000d.
65. The federal law entitled the "No Child Left Behind Act" requires that states
release standardized test scores for all students and groups including racial and ethnic
minorities, the poor, special education students, and students learning English as a
second language. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3) (2000). The release of test scores has
revealed significant achievement gaps between whites and some minority groups. See
infra note 79.
66. See Racial Privacy Initiative, at www.racialprivacy.org (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).
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an October 2003 special election Californians replaced former
governor Gray Davis with Arnold Schwarzennegger; 67 they also
rejected Proposition 54, the so-called "Racial Privacy Initiative. '6 8

Had the controversial referendum been approved by voters, the state
constitution would have been amended to prohibit state officials from
collecting data about a person's race.69 Proposition 54 would have

67. See Homepage of the California Secretary of State (detailing election results),
at http://vote2003.ss.ca.gov (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
68. Id.
69. For a full description of Proposition 54, see the California Legislative
Analyst's
Office
Report
(Aug.
11,
2003),
available
at
www.lao.ca.gov/initiatives/2003/54-10-2003.htm.
The Proposition was worded as
follows:
Section 32 is added to Article I of the California Constitution as follows:
Sec. 32. (a) The state shall not classify any individual by race, ethnicity,
color or national origin in the operation of public education, public
contracting or public employment.
(b) The state shall not classify any individual by race, ethnicity, color or
national origin in the operation of any other state operations, unless the
legislature specifically determines that said classification serves a compelling
state interest and approves said classification by a 2/3 majority in both
houses of the legislature, and said classification is subsequently approved by
the governor.
(c) For purposes of this section, "classifying" by race, ethnicity, color or
national origin shall be defined as the act of separating, sorting or organizing
by race, ethnicity, color or national origin including, but not limited to,
inquiring, profiling, or collecting such data on government forms.
(d) For purposes of subsection (a), "individual" refers to current or
prospective students, contractors or employees. For purposes of subsection
(b), "individual" refers to persons subject to the state operations referred to
in subsection (b).
(e) The Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) shall be
exempt from this section with respect to DFEH-conducted classifications in
place as of March 5, 2002.
(1) Unless specifically extended by the legislature, this exemption shall
expire ten years after the effective date of this measure.
(2) Notwithstanding DFEH's exemption from this section, DFEH shall
not impute a race, color, ethnicity or national origin to any individual.
(f) Otherwise lawful classification of medical research subjects and
patients shall be exempt from this section.
(g) Nothing in this section shall prevent law enforcement officers, while
carrying out their law enforcement duties, from describing particular persons
in otherwise lawful ways. Neither the governor, the legislature nor any
statewide agency shall require law enforcement officers to maintain records
that track individuals on the basis of said classifications, nor shall the
governor, the legislature or any statewide agency withhold funding to law
enforcement agencies on the basis of the failure to maintain such records.
(h) Otherwise lawful assignment of prisoners and undercover law
enforcement officers shall be exempt from this section.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which
must be taken to comply with federal law, or establish or maintain eligibility
for any federal program, where ineligibility would result in a loss of federal
funds to the state.
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prohibited the state university system from collecting racial data from
its current or prospective students. 7'
A number of prominent
opponents of affirmative action supported the measure, including
Shelby Steele, George Will, and Thomas Sowell. 1
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP") voted to oppose the Racial Privacy Initiative.72 The
NAACP concluded that a limit on state race data collection would
mean that authorities would not be able to "understand the positive or
negative impacts of their policies or programs on ethnic communities
including in the area of education, delivery of public services and
public assistance. ' 73 African-American leader Julian Bond blasted the
racial privacy initiative as a "deceptively titled" effort to "eviscerate
civil rights enforcement., 74 "As long as race counts, we have to count
race," Bond said.75
Even though there does not appear to be widespread support for
"racial privacy" at the moment, the defeat of Proposition 54 is
unlikely to act as the nail in the coffin of a bad idea. It is therefore
worth asking whether there are any good arguments for public
policies that treat a person's race as private information. Should
racial privacy be protected?
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR RACIAL PRIVACY
In many instances a person has to tell you whether some of his or
her ancestors came from North America, Europe, Africa, or Asia; you
could never guess it by looking. A prominent lawyer and educator,
(j) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any valid
consent decree or court order which is in force as of the effective date of this
section.
(k) For the purposes of this section, "state" shall include, but not
necessarily be limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county,
public university system, including the University of California, California
State University, community college district, school district, special district,
or any other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or
within the state.
(1) This section shall become effective January 1, 2005.
(m) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this section
are found to be in conflict with federal law or the United States
Constitution, the section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that
federal law and the United States Constitution permit. Any provision held
invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section.
Proposition
54,
available
at
Racial
Privacy
Initiative,
www.racialprivacy.org/content/language.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
70. See www.racialprivacy.org/content/legal/index.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
71. See www.racialprivacy.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
72. See Deborah Kong, NAACP Opposes California Initiative to Bar Racial
Classifying, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire, July 10, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News: Wire Service Stories (last accessed Jan. 28, 2004).
73. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Greg Williams, looks completely Caucasian. However, his father was
a fair-skinned man of part African ancestry, and his mother white. In
his book, Life on the Color Line, Williams described living first as a
"white" child in a community in which his father was a stranger, and
then as a "black" child, in his father's home town.76
Philosopher Adrian Piper also knows what it is like to walk the
"color line"; she has incorporated her personal story into compelling
art work. Piper, who looks white, has a strong African-American
identity and is the daughter of fair skinned African, white, and east
Indian ancestry parents who raised her in Harlem.7 7 Face does not
always reveal race and ethnic heritage.
A. De Facto Concealability
Racial identity and heritage are not always discernable from
appearance alone. This bare fact might be thought to constitute an
argument for prohibiting race data collection by the state. Since race
can be a secret, perhaps the state should not seek to know it. Yet race
is not usually capable of being hidden, and even if it were, that reality
alone would have no implications for public policy.
The social significance of racial categories has a lot to do with the
fact that what we call "race" is generally not capable of being hidden.
Many people consider race a matter of ancestry rather than
appearance, but nevertheless use facial appearance as an index of
ancestry. The "look and see" test of race works pretty well in most
instances. Not only is race often on the face; a person's race is also
often a matter of common knowledge in his or her community of
origin and documented in a diverse assortment of official and
unofficial sources. The inherently and largely public character of what
we call race in the United States might imply the foolishness of public
policies that treat race as a private matter, even in a society with
color-blind political aspirations.
Yet suppose race were something every individual could secret at
will, or something to which individuals had privileged access. Would
we then have a reason to treat race as a matter that ought to be
considered private as a matter of public policy? Many facts about
persons are capable of being concealed, but are uninteresting and
unsuitable for special protection. That someone has a sweet tooth, for
example is not a fact that cries out for protecting through public
policies. If we are going to have racial privacy laws, the case for them
needs a stronger foundation than de facto concealability.

76. See Gregory Howard Williams, Life On the Color Line: The True Story of a
White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black (1995).
77. See Piper, supra note 13, at 234-69.
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B. De Facto Preferences
Perhaps the point is not concealability, but preference. A second,
stronger argument for racial privacy would be this:
Racial
information merits privacy because some people prefer the privacy of
their race, and if people prefer the privacy of race, government should
respect that preference by refusing to document race. The argument
for racial privacy could be premised on the assumption that racial
privacy is not a majority preference, but a vitally important minority
preference worth protecting.
In my experience, very few people care if others know their race.
However some people do prefer the privacy of race, at least in
selected contexts. Many people travel the Internet under intentionally
assumed identities. They conceal or fake their race in their online
communications. The rewards of racial anonymity have been touted
(and the pitfalls acknowledged).7 8 The same person who enjoys
racially anonymous Internet surfing in her private life, however, might
favor race data collection for benign remedial or welfare-enhancing
purposes by government in her life as citizen voter. The No Child
Left Behind Act requires that the race of school children be collected
and reported;7 9 the same person who enjoys anonymous Web surfing
might be very glad that racial data collection enables her community
to discern and address achievement gaps between black and white
school children.80
Quite apart from the cyberworld, there are individuals and families
who build lives around the concealment of race or ethnicity. Some
"blacks" live their whole lives posing, or passing, as "white."
Moreover, I have known mixed-race "blacks" who did not speak
about their "white" parents and have heard of "whites" concealing
African or Jewish ancestry. Racial information should be treated as
private, the argument goes, because some people regard their racial
ancestry as private and should be at liberty to conceal it.
In considering whether to respect a preference, it is important to
consider why the preference is held. Why do the people who prefer
racial privacy prefer it? They do not prefer it out of modesty or
shame or a sense of intimacy-that's the territory of sexual privacy.
They are indifferent to racial disclosures as such, I believe; they care

78. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1130 (2000). Many people go
online for the purpose of finding same-race partners; they want their actual racial
identities to be known and valued. See id. at 1140.
79. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3) (2000).
80. When official No Child Left Behind Act-mandated achievement gap data was
reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer last year, I learned that the schools my two
children attend in suburban Philadelphia are burdened with the region's widest
achievement gaps between blacks and whites in reading and math, as measured by the
Pennsylvania System of School Assessment tests. See Achievement Gap, Phila.
Inquirer, Dec. 14, 2003, at CB5.
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about racial disclosures only to the extent that they believe racial
information will be used to harm or disparage. Concerns about racial
discrimination and disparagement are not irrational.
Racial
information has been used in the U.S. and other countries as a
instrument of public evil.
The EEOC guidelines for racial data reporting cited in the CBS
case 8 try to reconcile respect for the preference not to disclose racial
information with the public need for race data to enforce civil rights
laws. The guidelines presuppose that race is usually visible and that
most people will identify themselves by race and ethnicity if asked,
but that a minority of people will not want to disclose their race to
their employers. Out of respect for that preference, employers are not
authorized to compel disclosure of race;82 however, if an employee
declines to provide the information, the federal guidelines require that
the employer ascertain the person's race by visual inspection.8 3 This
policy against compelling racial self-disclosure costs the government
little since the fact of race will be apparent to the eye (and ear) in the
vast majority of cases. Again, race is in the face. Race is so much in
the face that, while racial data collectors are not supposed to secondguess racial classification asserted by an individual, an exception
applies if a person asserts a racial identity that is "patently"
inaccurate. 84
C. A Right Against Unwanted Race Data Collection
Since most people cannot conceal what officials will call their
"race" and most do not care to, I believe we need to search harder for
the rationale for racial privacy. A third argument for racial privacy is
that people have a moral right to control the collection and use of
identifying information injurious to their interests in dignity, security,
or non-discrimination. Racial information, like medical and financial
information is of this type, the argument might go.8
81.
82.
83.
84.

CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 556 N.E.2d 648, 650 (I11.App. 1990).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
According to the guidelines:
Self-identification is the preferred method of obtaining information
necessary to identify an individual by race, sex, or ethnic group. Where
information is not provided by an individual that indicates affiliation with a
race, sex, or ethnic group, the person requesting the information should,
where possible, secure and record the information through observation.
Note, the person attempting to secure information regarding race, sex, or
ethnic affiliation should not second guess or in any other way change a self
declaration made by an applicant or employee as to race, sex, or ethnic
background. An exception to this rule can be made where the declaration
by the applicant or employee is patently false.
Id. at 652 (quoting EEOC Compliance Man. (CCH) par. 5403, at § 632.3(b)(2)(iii)
(Mar. 1987)).
85. See, e.g., Wash. Post Co. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm'n, 560 A.2d 517,

1692

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

We know that in some contexts racial and ethnic disclosures can
unfairly disadvantage people, as the European Jews discovered en
route to the Holocaust, and Homer Plessy of Plessy v. Ferguson 6 fame
discovered aboard a Louisiana train. Identifying oneself as Cherokee
(Trail of Tears) or Japanese-American (World War II internment) has
led to loss of property and home in the American past.
People might wish to control the use of racial data because they
disapprove of the private or public purposes to which racial data
would be put. They might not wish, as the CBS court pointed out, to
have their race become a matter of public debate. 7 They might not
wish to facilitate race-specific medical, scientific, or social science
research. They might oppose race-based public programs, like
affirmative action or minority set-asides. They might prefer a colorblind society. They might believe race is a myth. The ultimate
questions are what justice allows and what it requires.
V. RAWLS ON RACE

Rawls famously presented his two main principles of justice as
principles that would be adopted by persons in "the original position,"
placed behind the "veil of ignorance." 8 In traditional social contract
theory, we are not asked to imagine that parties to the social contract
are ignorant about their own characteristics. However, persons in the
Rawlsian analogue-the original position-are ignorant about race
and other social identities:
In the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the

social positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the
persons they represent. They also do not know persons' race and

523 (D.C. App. 1989) (defendants and two intervenors alleged that disclosure of race
would lead to competitive disadvantages, but the court of appeals held that it was
"not persuaded that disclosure of the race, per se, of the principals of an enterprise
would lead to competitive injury").
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
87. CBS, 556 N.E.2d at 653.
It is our holding, therefore, that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the
assistant State's Attorneys, or any public employees, for that matter, have no
reasonable expectation that their racial identification will not be made the
subject of a public debate. To the contrary, they have a reasonable
expectation that they will have some say as to "when, how or to what extent
[such] information about them is communicated to others." It is also our
holding that the judge's finding that the dissemination of the information
sought by the plaintiff would be an invasion of privacy is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
Whether it constituted a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy" depends on the weighing of other factors
which will be discussed later.
Id. (citing United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 n.16 (1989)).
88. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement § 6, at 14 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001).
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ethnic group, sex or various native endowments such as strength and
intelligence ....
89
They are "veiled" against information and points of view that could
result in bias in the design of political justice. Rawls assumed that the
end product of the original position would reflect some sort of bias if
the parties possessed racial (or ethnic) information. Thus, he
stipulated ignorance about the parties' own racial identities. Note that
it does not follow that Rawls understood thoroughgoing
colorblindness to be a requirement of substantive justice. The raceignorance stipulation does not flow from a general principle
mandating colorblindness in all government affairs. It is an open
question whether a just, well-ordered society based on Rawlsian
principles would permit government to collect race data vital for, for
example, securing the health, educational achievement, or economic
well-being of all its citizens.
The first principle of justice emerging from the original position is
this: "Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the
same scheme of liberties for all." 9° A person's race will be irrelevant
to the strength of his or her claim on basic liberties. Racial data
collection aimed at treating some people unequally with others would
be prima facie unjust, much as the use of gender data collection
criteria or hair color data collection or family connections data
collection would be unjust. However, racial data collection with other
purposes, objectives, and consequences is not obviously ruled out.
Is racial privacy a basic liberty, though? If it were, we would have
to worry about racial data collection both because of its potential for
facilitating unequal treatment, and for its implications for liberty itself.
Among those basic constitutional liberties could be the liberty
imagined by the Pavesich court-equal basic liberty to choose the
manner of one's life, whether to live in relative seclusion or in the
public eye. But to argue that basic liberties include rights of
informational privacy, as they surely do, does not lead in any
straightforward manner to claims for the protection of racial privacy.
At a minimum, race has to be understood as something that is
amenable to meaningful concealment. In addition, it is partly an
empirical question whether some state data collection is benign.
Racial labeling could be a feature of a society in which "the political
and social conditions essential for the adequate development and full
exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons" is
satisfied.9 1 Freedom not to be labeled by any racial or ethnic category
by the state would not appear to be a basic liberty in the abstract.
89. Id. § 6.2, at 15.
90. Id. § 13, at 42.
91. Id. § 13.4, at 45.
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A society could find that race and ethnic information is pertinent to
legislative efforts to secure equal basic constitutional liberties. It could
also find that affirmative action programs and minority business setasides are called for by the first principle of justice and pass muster
with the second.
Rawls's second principle is this: "Social and economic inequalities
are to satisfy two conditions. First, they are to be attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the
least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle)."9 2
Government collection of racial data may serve benign purposes
tied to public health and the delivery of social services. Knowing the
racial and ethnic background of newborns and fully grown adults can
be pertinent to their care, as some medical abnormalities are more
common among some groups than others. A public hospital might
want to collect such information. In addition, taking into account
ethnic customs, religions, diets and lifestyles might be relevant to fair,
efficient and sensitive delivery of social services. Making free flu
shots available to a community on its day of religious worship is
probably a bad idea. Government needs to take notice of facts that
bear on social identities.
Racial minorities are not inherently among Rawls's least
advantaged. Opponents of affirmative action and proponents of the
racial privacy initiative seem to think race is a poor proxy for need
and disadvantage today. Rawls looks "conservative" to the extent
that he operates in the world of ideal theory in which neither race nor
gender are among the contingencies that (predictably and negatively)
affect life prospects: "Justice as fairness focuses on inequalities in
citizens' life prospects-their prospects over a complete life.. . -as
these prospects are affected by three kinds of contingencies: ... (a)...
social class.. .; (b) native endowments... ; (c) .. . good or ill
fortune. . . ."'
Rawls was aware that his American readers might wonder at the
exclusion of gender and race from the list of major contingencies
affecting life prospects. Thus, several pages later he writes:
It is natural to ask: Why are distinctions of race and gender not
explicitly included among the three contingencies noted earlier (§
16)? How can one ignore such historical facts as slavery-(in the
antebellum South) and the inequalities between men and women
resulting from the absence of provisions to make good women's
extra burden in the bearing, raising, and educating of children so as
to secure their fair equality of opportunity?94

92. Id. § 13, at 42-43.
93. Id. § 16, at 55.
94. Id. § 18.4, at 64-65.
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Rawls came to his own defense, justifying the exclusion on the
ground that his primary concern is "ideal" theory and the wellordered society, 95 not "partial compliance theory. ' 96 The least
advantaged are defined, he further explained, by deficits of wealth
and income, not properties of race or gender, for the least advantaged
"share with other citizens the basic equal liberties and fair
opportunities but have the least income and wealth." 97
At the same time, Rawls barely acknowledged the actual misfunctioning of race and gender traits in our society, in the form of a
supposition he does not firmly assert as a reality:
Suppose, for example, that certain fixed natural characteristics are
used as grounds for assigning unequal basic rights, or allowing some
persons only lesser opportunities; then such inequalities will single
out relevant positions. Those characteristics cannot be changed, and
so the positions they specify are points of view from which the basic
structure must be judged.
Distinctions based on gender and race are of this kind. Thus if men,
say, have greater basic rights or greater opportunities than women,
these inequalities can be justified only if they are to the advantage of
women and acceptable from their point of view. Similarly for
unequal basic rights and opportunities founded on race. It appears
that historically these inequalities have arisen from inequalities in
political power and control of economic resources. They are not
now, and it would seem never have been, to the advantage of
women or less favored races.98
It is pretty clear from reading Rawls that he did not want race to
matter in just societies. But I see nothing in Rawls to rule out raceconscious programs that stand to benefit the least advantaged in
society.9 9
Rawls offered "hope that in a well ordered society under favorable
conditions, with the equal basic liberties and fair equality of
opportunity secured, gender and race would not specify relevant
points of view."1
And yet in a society that is not perfectly wellordered, in which equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity
have not been secured, race and gender may specify relevant points of
view. Far from furthering justice, a law like the constitutional
amendment Proposition 54 contemplated 1 could limit the kinds of
95. Id. § 18.4, at 65.
96. Id. § 18.6, at 66.
97. Id. § 18.4, at 65.
98. Id. § 18.5, at 65 (internal citations omitted).
99. Some scholars have speculated further on this idea. See, e.g., Robert Allen,
Rawlsian Affirmative Action: Compensatory Justice as Seen from the Original
Position, available at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Soci/SociAlle.htm. (last visited
Jan. 28,2004).
100. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 88, § 18.6, at 66.
101. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition 54).
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remedial measures a society can take to extend equality of
opportunity. Racial minority group members have often lacked an
important primary good, "the social bases of self respect" and a
"lively sense of their worth as persons.., able to advance their ends
with self-confidence. ' 01 2 And while many privacy rights are surely
among primary goods, racial privacy-with its impracticalities, lack of
appeal and inconsistency with robust egalitarianism-is not a
condition of the social contract.
VI. RACIAL PRIVACY-A VERY CONTINGENT, IMPRACTICAL GOOD
Rawls illuminates why Pavesich should have won, as indeed he did
win. 3 The interest in not appearing in advertisements for products
one does not endorse, and without notice, consent or compensation is
an interest that goes to dignity and self-respect. Government should
protect us from such assaults. Being discriminated against arbitrarily
on the basis of race clearly violates Rawlsian principles, and when
racial labeling by government is a handmaiden of wrongful
discrimination, it is plainly unjust.
Rights to physical, informational, decisional, and proprietary
privacy that are critical to the enjoyment of equal liberty and equality
are rights the parties to the social contract and parties in the original
position would wish a just society to protect. Strangers who can use
our photographs for commercial advertising without permission are,
in effect, running our lives. They risk misleading the general public, as
well as embarrassing, humiliating and shaming us. We still run our
own lives, typically, when others learn about our race, ethnicity or
ancestry. Indeed, in the United States, we may live more proudly and
independently precisely because government officials lawfully possess
socially, economically and politically relevant race data about
individuals. In the present context, barring discrimination based on
race, not barring public race data collection, is the way to go.

102. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 88, § 17.2, at 59.
103. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905); see also supra
Part I.

